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Abstract  In 2010, Myanmar (Burma) held its first elections after 22 years 
of direct military rule. Few compelling explanations for this regime transition 
have emerged. This article critiques popular accounts and potential explanations 
generated by theories of authoritarian ‘regime breakdown’ and ‘regime 
maintenance’. It returns instead to the classical literature on military intervention 
and withdrawal. Military regimes, when not terminated by internal factionalism or 
external unrest, typically liberalise once they feel they have sufficiently addressed 
the crises that prompted their seizure of power. This was the case in Myanmar. 
The military intervened for fear that political unrest and ethnic-minority separatist 
insurgencies would destroy Myanmar’s always-fragile territorial integrity and 
sovereignty. Far from suddenly liberalising in 2010, the regime sought to create a 
‘disciplined democracy’ to safeguard its preferred social and political order twice 
before, but was thwarted by societal opposition. Its success in 2010 stemmed from 
a strategy of coercive state-building and economic incorporation via ‘ceasefire 
capitalism’, which weakened and co-opted much of the opposition. Having altered 
the balance of forces in its favour, the regime felt sufficiently confident to impose 
its preferred settlement. However, the transition neither reflected total ‘victory’ 
for the military nor secured a genuine or lasting peace.  
 
Key words: Myanmar, Burma, liberalisation, ethnic conflict, political economy, 
state-building, sanctions 
 
 
Introduction1 
                                                 
1 Research for this article was financed by an Economic and Social Research Council grant (RES-061-25-0500) 
for a project entitled ‘How Do Economic Sanctions (Not) Work?’ I am very grateful to Zaw Nay Aung, Kyaw 
Thu Mya Han and Aula Hariri for excellent research assistance. This article was originally presented as a paper 
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In 2010, Myanmar held its first elections since 1990, formally ending a 22-year military 
dictatorship.2 Although some small opposition parties participated, Aung San Suu Kyi’s 
National League for Democracy (NLD) boycotted the polls. Unsurprisingly, the Union 
Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) – backed by the Tatmadaw (Defence Services) 
and dominated by ex-military personnel – swept the board. Under the 2008 constitution, 
largely drafted by the military then approved through a stage-managed referendum, serving 
military officers also took a quarter of all parliamentary seats. Most observers dismissed the 
election as a rather irrelevant attempt to disguise continued military dictatorship: modest 
‘liberalisation’ at best.3 Subsequently, however, the civilianised administration of President 
Thein Sein, a former general and prime minister under the military junta, surprised many. 
The government unleashed extensive economic reforms; legalised political protests and trade 
unions; lifted media and internet restrictions; released most political prisoners; and 
incorporated some civil society groups and even former opponents into advisory bodies. The 
NLD won 43 seats in bye-elections held in 2012, enabling Aung San Suu Kyi to enter 
parliament and assume a leading role in legislative committees, including one established to 
revise the constitution. These remarkable developments led Western states to abandon most 
economic sanctions imposed on Myanmar. Many now take the regime transition more 
seriously and seek explanations for it. 
Recent literature is better at identifying what does not explain Myanmar’s transition 
than what does. Even leading experts express bafflement, saying it ‘is hard to line up reliable 
evidence behind any particular explanation’.4 Several recent articles debunk popular 
explanations, including the impact of Western sanctions, concern about Chinese influence, or 
fear of Arab Spring-like unrest, convincingly arguing that the regime moved from a position 
of strength, not weakness.5 Western sanctions had negligible or counterproductive effects.6 
                                                                                                                                                        
to a workshop on ‘Challenging Inequalities: Contestation and Regime Change in East and Southeast Asia’, 
Murdoch University, Perth, 12-13 July 2013. I am grateful to the workshop participants, particularly Aurel 
Croissant, Eva Hanson, and Meredith Weiss, and to Democratization’s anonymous reviewers, for feedback on 
earlier drafts.  
2 Burma was renamed Myanmar in 1989. This article uses ‘Burma’ to refer to the country before this, and 
‘Myanmar’ thereafter.  
3 Marco Bünte, "Burma’s Transition to 'Disciplined Democracy': Abdication or Institutionalization of Military 
Rule?,"(2011), 6-7. 
4 Mary Callahan, "The Generals Loosen Their Grip," Journal of Democracy 23, no. 4 (2012): 125-26; see also 
Nicholas Farrelly, "Discipline without Democracy: Military Dominance in Post-Colonial Burma," Australian 
Journal of International Affairs 67, no. 3 (2013): 323. 
5 Morten B. Pedersen, "The Politics of Burma's "Democratic" Transition," Critical Asian Studies 43, no. 1 
(2011); Callahan, "The Generals."; Kyaw Yin Hlaing, "Understanding Recent Political Changes in Myanmar," 
Contemporary Southeast Asia 34, no. 2 (2012); Robert H. Taylor, "Myanmar: From Army Rule to Constiutional 
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Although many people doubtlessly suffered under sanctions and military misrule, the regime 
successfully directed the economy eastwards, distributing booming natural resource export 
revenues to itself and its supporters. From 1988-2010, Myanmar’s gross domestic product 
increased from $12.6bn to $45.4bn, while imports rose from $246m to $4.8bn, exports, from 
$167m to $8.7bn, and foreign investment, from $4m to $8.3bn.7 China’s growing influence 
was similarly tolerated as the price of Beijing’s massive arms transfers, foreign investment, 
and diplomatic backing. Despite arousing popular and elite concern, Chinese influence did 
not suddenly escalate to intolerable levels that could explain an abrupt liberalisation.8  
Suggestions that the regime feared a popular uprising are also questionable. Having 
bloodily suppressed pro-democracy protests in 1988, the army imprisoned, repressed and 
disorganised its leading forces, the NLD and the ’88 Generation of Students. Despite minor 
‘hit-and-run’ protests in Yangon, democratic opposition was largely quelled, with anti-regime 
elements fleeing abroad and pursuing opposition through exile NGOs.9 Their weakness was 
symbolised through the ‘9-9-99’ campaign, which failed to initiate a hoped-for mass uprising 
in 1999. Meanwhile, although ethnic-minority rebellions initially persisted in the borderlands, 
as the army doubled in size, most signed ceasefires by the mid-1990s.10 The only serious 
post-1988 mass unrest was in 2007, when around 100,000 Buddhist monks demonstrated in 
major cities against price rises and demanded political change. However, as Zöllner  
documents, the wider population remained overwhelmingly passive, and the protests were 
quickly and brutally dispersed.11 Growing economic disparity, including that induced by 
sanctions, had not spurred revolt; instead, as one ethnic-minority leader recalls, ‘when the 
people became poorer and poorer, they became more apolitical... because they were only 
[focused] on their survival’.12 Anthropological studies concur that, despite widespread dislike 
of the regime, the population’s general response was depoliticisation, atomisation, mysticism, 
                                                                                                                                                        
Rule?," Asian Affairs 43, no. 2 (2012); Lee Jones, "The Political Economy of Myanmar's Transition," Journal of 
Contemporary Asia DOI: 10.1080/00472336.2013.764143(2013). 
6 Morten B. Pedersen, Promoting Human Rights in Burma: A Critique of Western Sanctions Policy(Lanham: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2008). 
7 IMF, "World Economic and Financial Surveys,"(2011); UNCTAD, "Unctadstat,"(2012). 
8 Taylor, "Myanmar: From Army Rule to Constiutional Rule?." 
9 Robert H. Taylor, The State in Myanmar(London: Hurst, 2009). 
10 Martin Smith, State of Strife: The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Burma(Washington, DC: East-West Center, 
2007). 
11 Hans-Bernd Zöllner, "Neither Saffron nor Revolution: A Commentated and Documented Chronology of the 
Monks’ Demonstrations in Myanmar in 2007 and Their Background,"(Berlin2009). 
12 Hla Saw, "Interview with the Author,"(Yangon2012). 
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and a focus on daily survival.13 In surveys conducted in 2010-2011, only 8% of respondents 
were prepared to join political protests, and only 6% anticipated Arab Spring-style unrest.14 
Many opposition leaders interviewed confirmed their inability to mobilise serious societal 
protest.15 As one laments: ‘the 2007 Saffron Revolution ended in failure. They [the regime] 
can control the whole country... they have won everything in Myanmar’.16 
Even if these popular explanations contained some truth, their fundamental weakness 
is an inability to explain earlier attempts to enact regime transition, which preceded the 
‘triggers’ that supposedly account for the 2010 transition. In 1990, elections were held for a 
constituent assembly, prior to governmental elections. From 1993-1996, the regime convened 
another constituent assembly, the National Convention (NC). The transition accomplished in 
2010 was not sudden, but began in 2003 with the regime’s ‘roadmap to democracy’, which 
involved reviving the NC from 2004-2007, a constitutional referendum in 2008, and finally 
holding elections.17 These repeated, lengthy moves towards regime transition invalidate 
explanations based on short-term crises or ‘tipping points’ reached at the end of the last 
decade. The 2007 protests, for example, occurred just after the NC’s conclusion. 
Political science theories of authoritarian ‘regime breakdown’ also seem unhelpful. 
The ‘breakdown’ of military governments – which are generally seen as the most fragile of 
authoritarian regimes – is usually attributed to threats to the armed forces’ coherence arising 
from intra-military factionalism, which prompts ‘soft-liners’ to seek pacts with a rising 
societal opposition, creating a top-down ‘transformation’.18 However, these factors were 
absent in Myanmar. Experts consistently observe that the Tatmadaw’s impressive coherence 
only increased over time. Reshuffles in 1997 and major purges during 2004-2005 actually 
strengthened and centralised the regime, with hard-liners reportedly ascendant.19  Moreover, 
the ‘roadmap to democracy’ continued its sluggish progress unaffected. Rather than regime 
                                                 
13 Monique Skidmore, Karaoke Fascism: Burma and the Politics of Fear(Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2004); Christina Fink, Living Silence in Burma: Surviving under Military Rule, 2nd 
ed.(London: Zed Books, 2007). 
14 Kyaw Yin Hlaing, "Understanding Recent Political Changes," 203. 
15 e.g. Than Nyein, "Interview with the Author,"(Yangon2012); Han Tha Myint, "Interview with the 
Author,"(Yangon2012). 
16 Hla Saw, "Interview." 
17 Government of Myanmar, "Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt Clarifies Future Policies and Programmes of 
State,"(2003). 
18 Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions 
About Uncertain Democracies(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Samuel P. Huntington, The 
Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 
ch.5; Barbara Geddes, "What Do We Know About Democratization after Twenty Years?," Annual Review of 
Political Science 2(1999). 
19 Bünte, "Burma’s Transition," 19-20; Taylor, "Myanmar: From Army Rule to Constiutional Rule?."; Farrelly, 
"Discipline without Democracy." 
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instability forcing ‘pacts’ with opposition forces, the transition was clearly ‘dictated’ from a 
position of strength – a scenario the ‘transitions’ literature generally neglects . 
Alternatively, one might analyse Myanmar’s transition as ‘regime maintenance’, an 
attempt to sustain authoritarianism by creating institutions that facilitate elite power-sharing 
or opposition co-optation.20 This view is advanced by Praeger Nyein, Bünte and Huang, who 
depict Myanmar’s transition merely as the ‘institutionalisation of military dominance’.21 
Whilst more persuasive, this perspective does not explain the transition’s timing or substance. 
If the military merely sought to perpetuate its own rule via new institutions, why did it not do 
so earlier? Since the junta was more coherent and the opposition weaker than ever, why 
would it need to innovate institutionally? If its leader, Senior General Than Shwe, sought to 
prolong his rule, why did he and his top brass retire, promoting a younger cohort 
generationally subordinate to Thein Sein? Furthermore, the extent of Thein Sein’s reforms 
also have also exceeded what the mere institutionalisation of army rule should permit. 
Although the Tatmadaw undoubtedly remains powerful, Callahan rightly observes ‘a new 
political fluidity... the military’s prerogatives have been shrinking... 2011 and 2012 have seen 
the armed forces as an institution step back from day-to-day governance’.22 Huang admits 
this seems problematic, suggesting that the army’s plans ‘backfire[d]’.23 If this were true, 
why does the Tatmadaw not simply re-intervene?  
Arguably, more reliable guidance is offered by the classical literature on military 
regimes, which highlight their distinctively temporary nature. A basic axiom for the theories 
considered above, which are inspired by rational choice theory, is that all leaders ‘want to get 
into office and remain there’.24 Accordingly, if a regime relinquishes power, it must either 
have been forced out by internal factionalism and/or societal opposition (‘regime 
breakdown’), or it has not really stepped aside because the same leaders remain in power, in 
disguised form (‘regime maintenance’). Conversely, earlier scholarship on military regimes 
argued that they were inherently temporary. Brooker notes: ‘historically, the type of 
dictatorship most likely to relinquish power has been rule by the military... because the 
                                                 
20 E.g. Andreas Schedler, ed. Electoral Authoritarianism(Boulder: Westview Press, 2006); K Gandhi and Adam 
Przeworski, "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats," Comparative Political Studies 40, no. 11 
(2007); Milan Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule(New York: Cambridge, 2012). 
21 Susanne Praeger Nyein, "Expanding Military, Shrinking Citizenry and the New Constitution in Burma," 
Journal of Contemporary Asia 39, no. 4 (2009); Bünte, "Burma’s Transition."; Roger Lee Huang, "Re-Thinking 
Myanmar's Political Regime: Military Rule in Myanmar and Implications for Current Reforms," Contemporary 
Politics 19, no. 3 (2013). 
22 Callahan, "The Generals," 120, 27. 
23 Huang, "Re-Thinking Myanmar's Political Regime: Military Rule in Myanmar and Implications for Current 
Reforms," 12. 
24 Geddes, "What Do We Know About Democratization," 125. 
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military has often seized power without intending to retain it permanently’.25 Military 
intervention is usually prompted and/or justified by severe social, economic and/or political 
crisis, and coup leaders typically pledge to restore democracy once the crisis is overcome.26 
However cynically we treat such pledges, they nonetheless mean that ‘military regimes are 
only really legitimised by their future... [they are,] in essence, transitory. A permanent system 
of military rule is almost a contradiction in terms’.27 Accordingly, Sundhaussen and Finer 
both found that militaries relinquished power once the motivations and/or societal conditions 
that prompted and enabled their intervention were reversed and reliable civilian successors 
were found (see Figure 1).28 
 
Reasons for Military Withdrawal 
 Military Dispositions Societal Conditions 
Motivations 
(a) Belief in civilian supremacy. 
(b) Threat to military cohesion. 
(c) Loss of self-confidence. 
(d) Domestic unrest, producing a 
legitimacy crisis, ungovernability 
or toppling the regime. 
(e) External factors: war, 
invasion, foreign policy disaster, 
withdrawal of foreign aid, 
sanctions. 
Necessary 
conditions 
(f) Internal consensus that 
withdrawal is appropriate. 
(g) Adequate protection of 
personal and corporate interests 
and ideologies under the 
successor regime. 
(h) Trustworthy civilians exist to 
whom power can be transferred. 
                                                 
25 Paul Brooker, Non-Democratic Regimes, 2nd ed.(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 197, 203, 
emphasis added. 
26 R.J. May, Stephanie Lawson, and Viberto Selochan, "Introduction: Democracy and the Military in 
Comparative Perspective," in The Military and Democracy in Asia and the Pacific, ed. R.J. May, Stephanie 
Lawson, and Viberto Selochan(Canberra: ANU E-Press, 2004), 27. 
27 Alain Rouquié, "Demilitarization and the Institutionalization of Military-Dominated Polities in Latin 
America," in Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives, ed. Guillermo O'Donnell, 
Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 110-11. 
28 Ulf Sundhaussen, "Military Withdrawal from Government Responsibility," Armed Forces and Society 10, no. 
4 (1984); S.E. Finer, "The Retreat to the Barracks: Notes on the Practice and the Theory of Military Withdrawal 
from the Seats of Power," Third World Quarterly 7, no. 1 (1985). For a similar, very recent argument that 
autocratic regimes more generally liberalise when they have ‘the strength to concede’ – a significant revision to 
existing democratisation theories – see Dan Slater and Joseph Wong, "The Strength to Concede: Ruling Parties 
and Democratization in Developmental Asia," Perspectives on Politics 11, no. 3 (2013). 
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Figure 1  
 
‘Regime breakdown’ theories identify only few of the potential reasons for military 
withdrawal, notably (b) and (d). However, the other reasons, particularly (f)-(h), suggest that, 
rather than disintegrating internally or  being ousted externally, military rulers may 
voluntarily withdraw, provided that the societal conditions they desire – a given political 
order and/or the security of their own interests, threats to which had initially prompted their 
intervention – would prevail under a post-military regime. This explains why military 
regimes typically labour to ‘fix the rules of the game’ by disciplining civilians and 
establishing constrained electoral systems – their most common method of withdrawal.29 
Achieving this may depend on the absence of factors (a)-(e). The military may not feel an 
orderly succession can be secured until it controls the internal or external threats that 
prompted its seizure of power. This seems particularly likely in cases like Myanmar, where 
the military is sufficiently strong to dictate the timing and means of the transition. In such 
cases, ‘the military withdrawal contains an element of continuity, and represents the 
accomplishment of the mission invoked to justify the initial intervention’.30  
This approach suggests that the explanation for the Tatmadaw’s withdrawal from 
direct rule lies not, as popular or ‘regime breakdown’ theories suggest, in internal dissension 
or external challenges, but rather the diminishment of the ‘threats’ that initially prompted 
military intervention, enabling the junta to impose a constrained electoral regime that would 
contain these ‘threats’ and safeguard the Tatmadaw’s corporate interests. From this 
perspective, explaining Myanmar’s  transition involves identifying what prompted military 
intervention; the regime’s political goals and strategies over time; how these were pursued 
and achieved to a satisfactory level (if not completely); and how this facilitated a top-down 
transition.  
This classical approach amends ‘regime maintenance’ accounts in two ways. First, it 
better explains the transition’s timing. Since regime transition depends on the regime’s ability 
to curb the challenges that prompted military intervention, its timing and nature is not 
dictated by incumbent elites alone, but stems from conflict and changing power relations 
                                                 
29 Rouquié, "Demilitarization," 114-21; see also Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and 
Governments(Eaglewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 141; Claude E. Welch, "Military Disengagement from 
Politics: Paradigms, Processes, or Random Events?," Armed Forces and Society 18, no. 3 (1992); Axel 
Hadenius and Jan Teorell, "Pathways from Authoritarianism," Journal of Democracy 18, no. 1 (2007). 
30 Rouquié, "Demilitarization," 127. 
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among multiple societal forces, which must be traced historically and situated within their 
broader geopolitical and economic context.31 The relative success of the regime’s post-2003 
transition strategy, compared to its less successful strategies in the 1990s, is thus explained by 
changing regime-opposition dynamics. Secondly, this approach jibes better with the relative 
‘fluidity’ Callahan observes in post-transition Myanmar. Although exploring this period is 
beyond this article’s scope, how we explain the transition carries significant consequences for 
how we analyse Myanmar’s trajectory today. Finer argued that the creation of electoral 
regimes, however constrained, is a form of ‘abdication’, not mere regime maintenance, 
because ‘the military have changed their role’. They are ‘no longer in the driving seat... Their 
role is simply to support... rulers whom they trust’.32 Similarly, Nordlinger argued that by 
creating electoral processes the military transform from ‘rulers’ to ‘moderators’.33 This may 
explain why Thein Sein’s government apparently enjoys some autonomy to pursue 
innovative policies and reforms, but only within ‘red lines’ that the Tatmadaw will not allow 
any government to cross.34 
The remainder of the article explains Myanmar’s transition using this classical 
approach. The first section identifies the military’s reasons for intervention, its goals, and its 
preferred political outcome. The main stimulant for military intervention in Myanmar has 
been centre-periphery conflict and the threat of ethnic-minority separatism – a risk 
exacerbated by the state’s near-collapse amidst widespread protests in 1988. Fearing chaos, 
the Tatmadaw seized power. However, it did not envisage perpetual rule, but instead pursued 
an orderly transition to civilian rule that would safeguard Myanmar’s integrity, restrain 
civilian political squabbling, contain centrifugal forces, and defend the military’s individual 
and corporate interests. Opposition resistance thwarted the junta’s efforts to impose 
‘disciplined democracy’ in the 1990s, but the same basic strategy succeeded in 2010. The 
second section explains how the regime achieved this. Through coercive and economic 
statecraft enabled by transformations in Myanmar’s political economy and geopolitical 
context, the military suppressed the democratic opposition and, most crucially, weakened the 
ethnic-minority resistance groups using violence and co-optation. Although the regime 
certainly did not entirely defeat these groups, in 2008 they nonetheless accepted a settlement 
                                                 
31 Kevin Hewison, Richard Robison, and Garry Rodan, "Political Power in Industrialising Capitalist Societies: 
Theoretical Approaches," in Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism, ed. 
Kevin Hewison, Richard Robison, and Garry Rodan(St Leonards: Allen and Unwin, 1993). 
32 Finer, "Retreat to the Barracks," 18. 
33 Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics, 22. 
34 Jones, "Political Economy of Myanmar's Transition," 13. 
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they had ‘vetoed’ in 1996. It is in this sense that the ‘periphery’ is central in explaining 
Myanmar’s transition.  
  
The Military Regime’s Goals and Strategy  
 
Despite much emphasis on the struggle between democrats and autocrats after 1988, arguably 
the most critical axis of socio-political conflict since Burma’s independence has been centre-
periphery struggles between the central government, dominated by the majority-ethnic 
Bamar, and ethnic-minority and communist insurgencies located in Burma’s borderlands. It is 
civilian politicians’ alleged inability to manage this conflict that has historically prompted 
military intervention and fostered the Tatmadaw’s self-perception as the only reliable 
guardian of Burma’s national survival. This outlook can obviously be criticised as self-
serving and cynical, or even ridiculed given the poor record of military governance. 
However, explaining – not endorsing – the military’s intervention and withdrawal from 
political control requires understanding its perspective, priorities and strategies. It was on this 
basis that the military seized control in 1988, as widespread protests toppled the sclerotic 
Burmese Socialist Program Party (BSPP) regime, to avert what it perceived as the threat of 
national disintegration. However, like other military regimes, the junta did not envisage 
perpetual rule but pledged to restore democracy. Initially unsure of how to do so, the regime 
eventually groped towards ensuring an orderly transfer to civilian rule that would safeguard 
its unitary vision of national stability, and the Tatmadaw’s own interests, by promoting a 
constitutional settlement that ‘locked in’ these outcomes. Societal opposition thwarted this 
strategy in the 1990s, but it resumed virtually unchanged with the 2003 ‘roadmap’ to 
‘disciplined democracy’, which eventually succeeded. 
 Centre-periphery conflict has been endemic in Burma since it gained independence in 
1948. Pre-colonial Burma had never been ruled as a coherent entity, and British colonialism 
had exacerbated existing ethnic divisions by governing Bamar-dominated ‘ministerial 
Burma’ directly while ruling through semi-autonomous chiefs in the borderlands, ethnic-
minority regions that comprise about 40% of Burma’s territory and a third of its population 
(see Figure 2). In 1945, Bamar nationalists sought rapid decolonisation, but the minorities 
feared losing their autonomy within a unitary, Bamar-dominated state. Nationalists struck a 
hasty accord with some minorities at Panglong in 1947, pledging to work towards substantial 
regional autonomy, and Burma’s 1947 constitution permitted minority states to secede after 
1957.  
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Officially-Designated Ethnic Groups in Myanmar 
Major Group Estimated Proportion of 
Population (2000) 
Bamar 66.9 
2 
1.4 
0.4 
6.2 
2.6 
4.2 
10.5 
5.7 
Chin 
Kachin 
Kayah 
Karen 
Mon 
Rakhine 
Shan 
Others 
Figure 235  
 
Militarised civil conflict prevented the consolidation of this fragile bargain. Armed 
minority-nationalist insurgencies began in western Burma even before independence. Shortly 
thereafter, the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) launched an insurrection, sparking 
widespread army mutinies and armed rebellion among the Karens, Karenni, Mon and Pao.36 
Burma’s first democratic government was thus instantly embroiled in centre-periphery 
conflict. The situation worsened in 1949 when a defeated Guomindang army retreated from 
China into Shan state, establishing military bases and trafficking opium to finance raids into 
China, backed by Thailand and the United States.37 When the Guomindang eventually 
withdrew, ethnic-minority rebels seized control of the opium trade, using it alongside 
gemstone and timber smuggling to finance their insurgencies. With rebels seizing control of 
virtually all of Burma’s borders by the late 1950s, the Bamar-dominated army became central 
to maintaining the country’s integrity, expanding dramatically and assuming extensive state-
building functions, its power gradually exceeding that of central government agencies.38  
                                                 
35 Tin Maung Maung Than, "Dreams and Nightmares: State Building and Ethnic Conflict in Myanmar 
(Burma)," in Ethnic Conflict in Southeast Asia, ed. Kusuma Snitwongse and Scott Thompson, W.(Singapore: 
ISEAS, 2005), 67. 
36 Smith, State of Strife, 10. 
37 Alfred McCoy, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia(New York: Harper & Row, 1972). 
38 Mary Callahan, Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007). 
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 Reflecting these threats to Burma’s national integrity and the Tatmadaw’s 
increasingly important role, military officers increasingly perceived civilian leaders as unable 
to halt the country’s disintegration. In 1958, amidst a major split in the ruling party, Prime 
Minister U Nu courted communist participation in the government, prompting coup threats 
from regional army commanders. Nu was forced aside by a military caretaker government 
from 1958-1960, which sought unsuccessfully to curtail civilian political opposition and 
infighting. After 1960, amidst continued civilian power struggles, U Nu courted Bamar 
support by establishing Buddhism as the state religion, sparking protest from non-Buddhist 
minorities. Shan, Mon and Rakhine leaders demanded greater regional autonomy, while other 
minority leaders openly discussed secession. Invoking an unacceptable threat to Burma’s 
national integrity, the army seized power again in 1962.39  
Like other military regimes, the ruling Revolutionary Council now tried to neutralise 
the threats that had prompted its intervention, before re-civilianising the government. 
Viewing civilian politics as fractious and corrupt, the army suppressed all parties and civil 
society organisations, establishing the BSPP as the sole political party in 1971. When it felt 
able to control the outcome, the junta consulted on a new constitution, which was adopted via 
referendum in 1974.40 Control was then passed to the military-dominated but nominally-
civilian BSPP. However, the transition only exacerbated centre-periphery conflict. The 1974 
constitution made no real concessions to ethnic minorities, who soon restarted their 
insurgencies. The army became locked into an endless series of counter-insurgency 
campaigns and, having eviscerated all other political forces, developed a powerful self-
perception as ‘the only national force capable of protecting and safeguarding the nation’.41 
In 1988, when the BSPP regime collapsed amidst widespread anti-government 
protests in Bamar cities against economic sclerosis, the Tatmadaw bloodily suppressed the 
uprising, seizing control as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). Burma’s 
paranoid and reactionary generals, shaped by decades of centre-periphery conflict, perceived 
the revolt as a plot between ‘internal and external destructionists’,42 with SLORC’s 
Secretary-1, General Khin Nyunt, arguing that ‘the  country was on the verge of 
                                                 
39 Tin Maung Maung Than, "Dreams and Nightmares," 75. 
40 David I Steinberg, Burma: The State of Myanmar(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2001), 
100. 
41 Curtis Lambrecht, "Oxymoronic Development: The Military as Benefactor in the Border Regions of Burma," 
in Civilizing the Margins: Southeast Asian Government Policies for the Development of Minorities, ed. 
Christopher R. Duncan(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 153. 
42 Farrelly, "Discipline without Democracy," 317. 
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disintegration’.43 Another senior general similarly stated that the ‘local tangential forces’ of 
the Bamar pro-democracy movement were ‘secondary’ to the primary threat of the 
borderlands’ ‘centrifugal forces’.44 SLORC’s intervention was justified as necessary to 
extinguish the ‘“fire of civil war”’, to prevent irresponsible parties and insurgents ‘destroying 
the state’.45 Commensurate with this reasoning, SLORC announced it would be guided by 
three ‘national causes’:  ‘non-disintegration of the Union; non-disintegration of national 
solidarity; and perpetuation of national sovereignty’.  
However, like other military regimes, SLORC denied seeking perpetual power but 
pledged to restore democracy. Shortly after seizing control in September 1988, General Saw 
Maung insisted SLORC had ‘absolutely no desire to hold onto state power for a prolonged 
period’ but would hold ‘multiparty general elections’ – scheduled for May 1990 – then 
‘return to the barracks’.46 This rapid concession reflected the army’s desperate need to pacify 
Myanmar’s highly mobilised opposition forces, amidst the collapse and near-bankruptcy of 
state institutions. However, reflecting the general trial-and-error evolution of regime 
strategies,47 as the situation stabilised, SLORC realised the risks of a hasty transfer of power 
and began seeking a new constitutional settlement that would subdue political and separatist 
conflicts and safeguard corporate Tatmadaw interests. Since the 1974 constitution had failed 
to maintain order, and had been dissolved by the coup, SLORC argued that transferring 
power immediately risked creating a weak state that could quickly collapse. Accordingly, in 
mid-1989, SLORC announced that the 1990 polls were to elect an assembly to draft a new 
constitution, to be followed by a constitutional election and fresh elections. Insisting on the 
importance of ‘national reconsolidation’ and the ‘emergence of a new enduring state 
constitution’, SLORC insisted it would maintain order while a charter was drafted ‘step by 
step’.48  
However, this first attempt to create a successor regime that would safeguard the 
army’s ‘national causes’ was thwarted by opposition resistance. In 1990, despite widespread 
repression, the NLD won 60% of the vote and 81% of the seats. With Western support, it 
demanded an immediate transfer of power. SLORC refused, insisting that a suitable 
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constitution must first be drafted. The NLD proposed simply reviving the 1947 constitution, 
but since this had enabled ethnic-minority secession, the Tatmadaw refused. The army’s 
hostility deepened when an NLD spokesman suggested Nuremburg-style trials for leading 
generals, threatening the military’s personal and corporate interests.49 When the NLD sought 
to convene the elected parliament, SLORC perceived an attempt to form a parallel 
government. Arguing this would instigate chaos, it cracked down hard, initiating a twenty-
year standoff.  
SLORC then groped towards a new strategy for regime transition, albeit with the 
same basic constitution-referendum-elections sequence. In 1992, the regime convened a 
National Convention (NC) to draft a new constitution. To avoid a repeat of 1990, it diluted 
elected representatives with more pliable individuals. Importantly, ethnic-minority delegates 
also participated. This was enabled by the collapse of the CPB insurgency in 1989, as 
widespread mutinies splintered its militias along ethnic lines. Several war-weary groups 
subsequently signed ceasefires with SLORC from 1989-1991. The army was then 
concentrated against the hold-outs, generating further ceasefires. By 1996, 14 ceasefires had 
been agreed, covering most major resistance organisations, several of which joined the NC. 
SLORC’s generals now believed that moves to restore democracy in 1990 had been 
‘premature’, and consequently sought an orderly transition to a constrained – ‘disciplined’, or 
‘discipline-flourishing’ – democracy.50 Reflecting SLORC’s ‘national causes’, the regime 
insisted that the NC be guided by several non-debatable ‘basic principles’, which sought to 
constrain Myanmar’s centrifugal forces by establishing a strong central state with a leading 
role for the military in maintaining national integrity (see Figure 3). However, opposition 
forces again resisted these constraints. The NLD walked out of the NC in 1995 and, more 
importantly, several ceasefire groups demanded greater autonomy than SLORC dared 
concede. Lacking the strength to simply impose its will, SLORC had to abandon the NC in 
1996. It reorganised itself into the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in 1997, 
settling in for a long haul. 
The regime’s third attempt at regime transition repeated much the same pattern. The 
2003 ‘roadmap to democracy’ involved reconvening the NC to design a ‘disciplined 
democratic system’; the drafting of a new constitution; its adoption via a referendum; 
elections and the formation of a new government. The SPDC’s stated concerns and objectives 
remained as constant as its unimaginative methods:  
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since... independence, armed insurrection emerged across the country... result[ing] in 
the weakening of national unity... Without trying to heal these own injuries and 
wounds it is very difficult to change overnight into a democratic state... [We must 
ensure] the emergence of a disciplined democratic system that does not [a]ffect... the 
Union of the national races... [or] the integrity of our people and nation.51 
  
Accordingly, identical constraints were placed on the NC, which reconvened from 2004-
2007, without the NLD (which boycotted proceedings) but with expanded ethnic-minority 
participation. The roadmap survived the 2005 purge of its architect, General Khin Nyunt, 
underscoring the regime’s consensus on basic strategy. Minority leaders again complained of 
being ignored and won few concessions. Nonetheless, this time the NC concluded 
successfully, drafting a constitution virtually identical to that proposed by SLORC in 1993 
(see Figure 3). The stage-managed constitutional referendum was held in 2008; elections, in 
2010; and power transferred to a civilian administration in 2011, completing the ‘roadmap’. 
 
Comparison of Constitutional Proposals and Outcome 
1993-1996 National Convention 2008 Constitution 
Aims and Objectives of the State: ‘non-disintegration of the 
Union; non-disintegration of national solidarity; 
perpetuation of sovereignty; flourishing of a genuine 
multiparty democracy system; ... justice, liberty and 
equality... for the Tatmadaw to be able to participate in the 
national political leadership role’. 
Identical, except an 
amendment to ‘genuine, 
disciplined multi-party 
democratic system’. 
State Structure: Seven Regions (covering predominantly-
Bamar central Myanmar), seven States (predominantly 
ethnic-minority states), and six Self-Administered Regions 
and zones (special autonomous areas delegated to ceasefire 
groups). Authority is highly centralised, with very limited 
local autonomy and no right to secession. 
Identical, except for a change 
in the capital city.  
Executive: Presidential system. President and Vice-
Presidents to be selected by an electoral college formed 
Identical, though executive 
responsibilities are further 
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from the legislature. Candidates must be born to Myanmar 
parents; aged at least 45; ‘well acquainted’ with matters of 
state, including ‘military affairs’; resident in Myanmar for 
20 years prior to an election; and they, their spouse and 
children must ‘not owe allegiance to a foreign power’ or be 
foreign citizens.* The president appoints the cabinet, but 
must select military personnel as ministers and deputy 
ministers of defence, security/ home affairs and border 
affairs. The president, vice-president and ministers must 
resign their seats in the legislature and not participate in 
party activities.  
elaborated and they may be 
dismissed for ‘inefficient 
discharge of duties’. A 
National Defence and Security 
Council, comprising 
executive, legislative and 
military leaders, is also 
established to assist the 
president and assume 
governmental powers during 
emergencies. 
Legislature: Bicameral national parliament comprising 
lower house elected on the basis of population, and upper 
house with equal representation from each region/ state. 
Regional/ state/ zone parliaments are elected on basis of 
population. 25% of seats are reserved for military personnel. 
 
Identical, except House of 
Representative constituencies 
are allocated to townships as 
well as by population, and 
parliamentary responsibilities 
and procedures are elaborated. 
Judiciary: Independent. Hierarchy of supreme court, 
region/state high courts, and subordinate law courts. 
 
Identical. Judicial 
responsibilities are further 
elaborated; ‘judges may be 
dismissed for inefficient 
discharge of duties’. 
Military: Military affairs are governed ‘independently’ by 
the Tatmadaw. During a ‘state of emergency characterised 
by inability to perform executive functions’, the President 
may assert executive powers but the army also ‘has the 
right... to pre-empt that danger and provide protection’. The 
army is assigned responsibility for ‘safeguarding non-
disintegration of the Union, non-disintegration of national 
solidarity and perpetuation of sovereignty’ and protecting 
the Constitution. If these are threatened, the army 
commander-in-chief ‘has the right to take over and exercise 
state power’.  
Identical, except for 
provisions for the National 
Defence and Security Council 
to reassume governmental 
power and restore democracy 
once the emergency ends; the 
army commander-in-chief is 
given vice-presidential status; 
and military justice is the 
military’s sole domain. 
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* These conditions were designed to render Aung San Suu Kyi ineligible. 
Fig. 3.52 
 
 To summarise: the Tatmadaw’s predominant concern has been the Union’s territorial 
integrity and political stability, particularly the threat from ethnic separatism. Consequently, 
although the post-1988 military regime sought to transfer power to civilians, it sought durable 
safeguards to defend Myanmar’s unity and preserve the Tatmadaw’s leading role. The regime 
pursued this goal repeatedly, pressing other societal actors to accept a ‘disciplined 
democracy’. Thus, Myanmar’s regime transition in 2010 was not a ‘sudden’ event requiring 
short-term explanations, but the culmination of a lengthy struggle. How did the regime 
succeed in 2010, having failed in 1990 and 1996? 
 
Transformations in Political Economy and State-Building in Myanmar, 1988-2010 
 
The basic answer is that the balance of power between regime and opposition forces shifted 
fundamentally in the former’s favour, enabling it to diminish (though not destroy) the threats 
that had prompted its intervention and withdraw on its own terms. This outcome stemmed 
from the transformation of Myanmar’s geopolitical and economic context, which supported 
the regime’s strategies to centralise power and reduce centrifugal challenges, giving it the 
confidence to resume Myanmar’s forced march to ‘disciplined democracy’.  
 
The Post-Cold War Shift ‘from Battlefields to Marketplaces’ 
 
Though rooted in local grievances, Burma’s communist and separatist insurgencies were 
always sustained externally to a significant degree. Throughout the Cold War, neighbouring 
states aided rebel groups along their borders, providing sanctuary and enabling the 
transboundary smuggling of drugs, timber, gemstones and weapons that supported the 
insurgencies. By 1987, this black-market trade had reached an estimated $3bn, 40% of 
Burma’s GDP.53 Defeating the insurgencies was impossible while this trade flourished. A 
critical change, therefore, was the post-Cold War reorientation of neighbouring states, 
particularly China and Thailand. As the ideological and material benefits of backing the 
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insurgents waned, powerful politico-business elites sought full access to Myanmar’s 
lucrative, largely-untapped natural resources, which required sound government-to-
government relations, not piecemeal smuggling. Consequently, having stopped aiding the 
CPB in the 1970s, China abandoned it entirely in 1989, instead cultivating ties with SLORC. 
Thailand also stopped supporting Burma’s anti-communist rebels, seeking instead to 
transform ‘battlefields into marketplaces’.54 ASEAN likewise pursued ‘constructive 
engagement’ with SLORC.  
 This shift strengthened SLORC against opposition groups in three ways. First, 
neighbouring states pushed insurgents to sign ceasefires. Second, the state was rescued from 
near-bankruptcy by an influx of foreign investment and trade deals in logging, fisheries and 
mining, with rents now flowing to the regime rather than rebels. Foreign investment boomed 
from $58m in 1990/91 to $800m by 1996/7, much of which went to military-linked firms.55 
Hardwood timber exports alone earned $160m annually from 1988-1995.56 Thai loggers also 
built roads through the borderlands, facilitating military penetration.57 Third, the regime 
evaded the Western arms embargo, importing over $2bn of predominantly-Chinese weaponry 
with assistance from Singaporean banks.58  
These developments stabilised the regime, boosted the ceasefire drive, and gave 
SLORC the confidence to convene the first NC, since ‘the conditions for peace and stability 
improved... [and] national unity had been built to a certain extent’.59 However, SLORC was 
still too weak to impose its preferred settlement. The NLD resisted and, more importantly, 
some key ceasefire groups, like the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), boycotted the 
NC. Others protested the limited autonomy provisions being offered; and still others 
remained in armed rebellion. The army lacked sufficient strength to impose its preferences 
without risking renewed armed conflict. How did the Tatmadaw surmount these challenges? 
 
Coercion, Ceasefire Capitalism and Centralisation 
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Part of the answer is coercion, enabled by the transformed political economy context. Using 
newly-available resources, SLORC doubled the army’s size and built a powerful military 
intelligence apparatus that penetrated most opposition groups.60 Having already incarcerated 
many pro-democracy activists, SLORC repressed the NLD after its NC boycott, provoking 
mass defections and the closure of all its offices outside the capital. By the early 2000s, the 
pro-democracy movement had largely been ‘crushed’, with only Western backing enabling its 
survival.61 Military penetration of the borderlands also increased sharply. The expanded army 
was able to establish garrisons in ceasefire groups’ territory, shifting from seasonal counter-
insurgency campaigns to permanently hold territory. The regime thereby captured rebel 
groups’ natural resource bases and forcibly relocated their supporters, while the state was 
enabled to ‘tax, monitor and micromanage the populace’.62 The Tatmadaw also exploited 
rebel divisions, co-opting splinter groups to fight their former comrades.  
However, also important was the co-optation of borderlands elites and the 
centralisation of politico-economic power through ‘ceasefire capitalism’. Ethnic-minority 
rebels largely signed ceasefires out of war weariness, poverty and a desire for development. 
Accordingly, their subsequent incorporation into a national system of rule was primarily 
pursued through economic means: development spending; joint business ventures; and the re-
routing of economic flows to benefit the regime. As one junta leader explains, these strategies 
sought ‘to enhance the centripetal forces holding the country together by... nullify[ing] the 
centrifugal forces made up of the secession-seeking minority/ national races, insurgents, 
narcotics groups, and even the straggling communists, by inviting them back to the legal 
fold’.63 
The ceasefires established a basic quid pro quo: in exchange for suspending armed 
struggle, former rebels would receive government development assistance, retain control over 
some territory and checkpoints, and continue cross-border trading, initially including opium. 
These pacts converted many ethnic-minority leaders into government ‘subcontract[ors]’.64 
Army outposts, government agencies and NGOs entered the borderlands, extending the 
state’s reach into areas it had never controlled. By 2003, the government spent $506m on 
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borderlands development and social services to promote the ‘consolidation of national unity’, 
which was regarded as the ‘basic foundation... of [a] democratic system’.65  
 More important was the incorporation of ethnic-minority elites through their 
participation in capitalist economic development. This took two main forms. First, the regime 
initiated joint ventures with local elites to exploit the borderlands’ natural resources, notably 
in logging, mining and agriculture, helping ‘the regime to expand its military, administrative 
and economic reach into areas of the country where it previously had little or none’.66 The 
army and ceasefire groups’ militias guarded these operations, whilst local elites brokered 
transboundary investments via black market contacts. Foreign trade and overseas investment 
were again critical in enabling this strategy. Two-thirds of foreign investment went to just 
three resource-rich minority states.67 Export revenues financed patronage networks centred 
on army regional commanders, who also dispensed resource concessions to local elites who 
brokered ceasefires.68 The alliances formed around extractive industries generated new power 
structures in the borderlands, which Callahan dubs ‘“emerging political complexes”... flexible 
and adaptive networks that link state and other political authorities to domestic and foreign 
business concerns... traditional indigenous leaders, religious authorities, overseas refugee and 
diaspora communities, political party leaders, and NGOs.’69  
 The second form of economic incorporation involved encouraging borderlands elites 
to invest their illegally-obtained wealth in the national economy. After paying a 25% 
‘whitening’ tax, drugs barons and smugglers could launder their money through state-owned 
banks and invest in ‘legitimate’ national businesses. Loyal individuals who rendered useful 
services again received extensive patronage, with borderland kingpins establishing large-
scale conglomerates, receiving lucrative government contracts, and dominating the emerging 
private banking sector.70  
 The money-laundering process highlights a crucial aspect of ‘ceasefire capitalism’: 
the deliberate re-routing of economic flows to strengthen the central regime and weaken 
‘centrifugal forces’. Promoting economic development in the borderlands risked 
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strengthening ceasefire groups. To avoid this, the regime increasingly centralised economic 
flows, making access dependent on loyalty to the state. Thus, mining permits issued to 
ceasefire groups initially insisted that at least 10% of their gemstones were sold through 
government-run auctions in Yangon.71 However, by the mid-2000s, all gemstones mined by 
joint ventures had to be sold in this way, and most exports to China, Myanmar’s major 
market, had been re-routed through Yangon, and later Naypyidaw.72 By taking control of 
valuable jade mines, the Tatmadaw ‘shut out’ many businesses linked to the KIO, redirecting 
lucrative rents to itself and its allies.73 Similarly, timber exports were redirected from cross-
border roads, controlled and ‘taxed’ by the KIO, to Yangon’s port, in order to ‘squeeze the 
KIO out of the timber business and thus weaken their political position against the regime’.74 
In agribusiness, local elites either joined increasingly centralised networks of army 
commanders and Chinese investors, or were squeezed out. These strategies ‘increased state 
funds... [and] – more importantly – cut off ethnic political resistance groups’ access to 
resource rents... trading networks became connected to the regime’s wider patron-client 
relations’, with power shifting from local headmen to ‘regional and national military 
officials’.75 These manoeuvres were supported by development spending on road-building, 
which facilitated military penetration that helped deprive ‘insurgent groups... of their resource 
base, [and] assert control over the lucrative border trade’.76 Although these developments 
massively empowered regional commanders, the risk that they would establish independent 
powerbases was countered by appointing them to the SPDC and other national positions . 
Meanwhile, rising foreign investment in state monopolies like hydropower, oil and gas 
bolstered the regime, since export rents flowed directly to the state, bypassing the borderlands 
entirely. Accordingly, from 1990-2005 the estimated ratio of smuggling to official trade fell 
from 85 to 50%.77  
It is important to underscore that this centralising process was contested, uneven and 
incomplete. Along the Thai border, for example, Sino-Thai rivalry has allowed the United 
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Wa State Army (UWSA) to retain considerable control over local rents and thereby maintain 
large militias.78 Cross-border smuggling persists, and extractive investments reinforce 
transnational economic relations, not merely national ones. The gains from development 
spending and ceasefire capitalism have accrued to narrow elite, while rapacious extractive 
projects alienated many. Crucially, the SPDC never addressed the minorities’ political and 
cultural grievances. Ceasefires marked the absence of war, not genuine or lasting peace. 
Despite this, the overall trajectory clearly favoured the regime, reducing many ceasefire 
group leaders’ will and capacity to resume armed struggle. This allowed the SPDC to launch 
its ‘roadmap’ to ‘disciplined democracy’. 
 
Resuming the Roadmap 
 
Like other military regimes, the Tatmadaw retreated from direct governmental control once it 
had sufficiently diminished the challenges that had prompted its intervention, notably ethnic-
minority insurgencies and pro-democracy forces, and found trustworthy civilian organisations 
to take over, in the form of the USDP.  
 The 2003 announcement of the ‘roadmap to democracy’ reflected the SPDC’s 
growing confidence that insurgent threats, whilst definitely not eliminated, were sufficiently 
under control to permit a transition to ‘disciplined democracy’. SPDC minister General David 
Abel articulates this explicitly, stating that in the 1990s, ‘we didn’t have peace in the 
country... The mechanisms of democracy couldn’t work, because we had these insurgencies. 
Now that the insurgency has almost come to an end, we implemented... the roadmap’.79 The 
change in centre-periphery power relations was reflected in the behaviour of ethnic-minority 
leaders. In the 1990s, some major ceasefire groups had boycotted the NC, some maintained 
separatist platforms, and others remained in armed rebellion. By 2004, virtually every group 
had signed a ceasefire, and the last major holdout, the Karen National Union, entered peace 
talks; all had abandoned separatism to pursue regional autonomy within the Union of 
Myanmar; and all major groups joined the NC, seeing the roadmap as the ‘culmination of 
their ceasefire strategies’, a chance to embed their post-1988 gains.80 Despite similar 
complaints about the limited regional autonomy on offer, in 2007 they approved a 
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constitution almost identical to that offered in 1996. The KIO’s conduct was emblematic. 
Having boycotted the 1993-1996 NC, in 2004-2007, they participated. In 2007, while 
Buddhist monks were marching in Yangon, KIO leaders were attending pro-NC mass rallies, 
and in 2008 they instructed their followers to vote ‘yes’ in the constitutional referendum.81 
 The pro-democracy opposition’s relative decline was also apparent. In 1995, the NLD 
boycott had effectively ‘vetoed’ the NC. In 2004-2007, the much-weakened NLD again 
boycotted the NC, but the regime proceeded nonetheless. By then the SPDC had created a 
‘civilian’ organisation to which it could transfer power without threatening its ‘national 
causes’ or corporate interests: the Union Solidarity and Development Association, a mass 
organisation claiming 23 million members, which converted into the USDP to contest the 
2010 elections. Realising, like the minorities, that the ‘roadmap’ was the only game in town, 
many non-NLD opposition politicians also joined the electoral process. The NLD splintered, 
with the National Democratic Force (NDF) breaking away to participate in the polls. The 
SPDC thereby successfully bounced the weakened, fragmented opposition into its preferred 
settlement. As NDF chairman Khin Maung Swe observes, ‘without any effort of politicians, 
or the NLD, or us, the political scenario has changed. It changed only because Than Shwe 
and his military top brass decided to move’.82  
 
Conclusions and Implications 
 
This article argued that Myanmar’s regime transition shares many characteristics with other 
transitions from military rule. Classical treatments of military dictatorships suggest that, 
assuming they succumb neither to internal factionalism nor external revolt, militaries retreat 
from direct political control when they feel they have sufficiently addressed the social, 
political and/or economic crises that prompted their intervention and can install a successor 
regime that will safeguard the military’s preferred socio-political and economic order and 
protect its corporate interests. In Myanmar, military intervention has been driven by the 
perceived inability of civilian administrations to manage centre-periphery conflict and ethnic-
minority separatism. After seizing power in 1988, the army sought to impose a constitutional 
settlement that would minimise destabilising political rivalries and contain Myanmar’s 
‘centrifugal forces’. However, this plan for ‘disciplined democracy’ was repeatedly thwarted 
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by societal opposition in the 1990s. Subsequently, however, structural geopolitical and 
economic changes combined with the SPDC’s coercive and economic statecraft tipped the 
balance of forces in its favour. The democratic opposition was repressed, while ‘ceasefire 
capitalism’ incorporated and reduced the perceived threat from Myanmar’s ‘centrifugal 
forces’. By diminishing the challenges that had prompted military intervention, and reducing 
effective resistance to its plans, the SPDC was enabled to impose its ‘roadmap’ to 
‘disciplined democracy’.  
 Although these shifting power relations sufficed to allow the regime to liberalise, this 
does not mean that centre-periphery conflict has ended. Certainly, the state’s territorial reach 
and coercive power are greater than ever, and ethnic minorities now seek a future within, 
rather than apart from, the Union of Myanmar. Nonetheless, the strategies that enabled these 
results won the state few allies and precious little affection. Moreover, like most settlements 
imposed through coercion and elite cooptation, the 2008 constitution failed to address many 
wider grievances and consequently does not guarantee the peace and stability sought by the 
SPDC. It does not satisfy the demands of democratic forces, nor does it address the 
minorities’ aspirations for local autonomy, cultural rights, and greater control over natural 
resource revenues. On the contrary, army brutality, forced displacement, and the rapacious 
extractive investments and land grabs associated with ‘ceasefire capitalism’ only fuelled 
popular resentment among minority populations, even if their leaders had essentially been co-
opted, neutralising their capacity to resist.  
The limits of the SPDC’s ‘success’ were clearly displayed during the transition. In 
2009, the regime demanded that ceasefire groups’ militias convert into ‘border guard forces’ 
(BGFs) under army command as a condition for their participation in the elections, despite 
earlier agreements that the merger would take place afterwards. Although complaining 
vociferously, several groups complied. However, others refused, and several ceasefires 
collapsed. Although the Tatmadaw swiftly suppressed the weaker militias, it struggled 
against the stronger UWSA and the KIO. Unlike in previous decades, this conflict was now 
geographically contained, posing no threat to the central government, and consequently did 
not derail the roadmap. Nonetheless, it apparently created the long delay between the 2008 
referendum and the 2010 elections and certainly illustrated the limits of the regime’s coercive 
power. Moreover, the KIO was considerably rejuvenated. Forced to resume armed struggle, 
the KIO leadership, long alienated from the Kachin masses through its co-optation by the 
SPDC and participation in ‘ceasefire capitalism’, suddenly reconnected with its disaffected 
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base. This has enabled it to sustain considerable guerrilla resistance against Tatmadaw 
offensives.  
The quest for a more stable settlement in the borderlands has fallen to the Thein Sein 
administration, which has pursued individual ceasefires ahead of national negotiations – a so-
called ‘second Panglong’. The government has mooted the possibility of constitutional 
amendments and ‘federalism’, historically a threatening notion, has even been floated by one 
minister. In another unprecedented development, Thein Sein has permitted the involvement 
of Norway, Japan, China and the United Nations in the peace process. These unusual 
developments are apparently consistent with Finer and Nordlinger’s view that the military’s 
withdrawal from direct control introduces new political dynamics rather than simply 
representing ‘regime maintenance’. Yet, exactly how much latitude the new government 
enjoys within the Tatmadaw’s ‘red lines’ is unclear. Notwithstanding the reformist 
commitments of some ministers, the military still controls the ministries of defence and 
border affairs and remains central to borderlands governance. ‘Divide and rule’ strategies 
have been maintained and offensives against the KIO have persisted despite two presidential 
ceasefire orders, delaying a settlement and displacing around 100,000 people. Despite Thein 
Sein’s reforms, the powerful interests embedded in ‘ceasefire capitalism’ have also 
perpetuated its predatory dynamics, generating deepening resentment.83 How much the army 
and other conservative Bamar elites are prepared to concede to the minorities to achieve a 
genuine political settlement remains unclear. Although some modernisers accept that new 
strategies are required, the military – including the retired officers leading the USDP – fought 
for decades to impose its designs, and many may resist. Although military re-intervention in 
politics remains unlikely while unrest in the borderlands remains geographically contained, 
any escalation or spread of conflict – including the increasingly violent communal strife 
between Buddhists and Muslims – will severely escalate the risk. All of Myanmar’s political 
forces, including opposition parties, recognise that they are steering a fine line between 
promoting reform and provoking a military backlash. Even so, and although Myanmar’s 
armed groups may no longer seriously threaten the state’s integrity, the Bamar elite may still 
need to learn that there can be no lasting peace without justice. 
 
Notes on Contributor 
                                                 
83 Jones, "Political Economy of Myanmar's Transition." 
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